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The 'duh' standard is the basic premise
in Montana's rules of judicial notice
By Professor Cynthia Ford
Alexander Blewett III School of Law
Judicial notice is a shortcut to proof of a fact at trial. If the
judge does "notice" a fact, the parties need not (and sometimes
may not) put on evidence of that fact at trial. Instead, the judge
instructs the jury that the particular fact is true for the purposes
of the case. This process, obviously, is a huge time-and-money
saver for the lawyers, their clients, juries and court personnel.
The basic premise of judicial notice is that facts that are so
clearly true that no reasonable person would dispute them.
Justice Laurie McKinnon, writing for the Montana Supreme
Court in 2014, said the same thing, better: "One function of
judicial notice is to avoid a waste [of] time litigating about un-
deniable matters." Edward J. Imwinkelried, Courtroom Criminal
Evidence vol. 2, § 3002, 30-2 (5th ed., Bender 2011) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)." In re Marriage of
Carter-Scanlon & Scanlon, 2014 MT 97, 17, 374 Mont. 434,
439, 322 P.3d 1033, 1037. I have reformulated the test into more
prosaic terms: the "Duh!" test: If, after the necessary witness(es)
and/or exhibit(s) put on proof of a fact, the jurors would say to
themselves "duh," the court should shortstop the process and
take judicial notice of that fact. If, on the other hand, the jurors
would say, "Who knew?" the matter is better left to the crucible
of proof and the court should deny judicial notice.
Both the Montana and Federal Rules of Evidence provide for
judicial notice. However, whereas most of the MRE are substan-
tially the same as their federal counterparts, our state rules on
judicial notice vary dramatically from the FRE. In my opinion,
the Montana version is much the better of the two. Below, I do
a brief comparison of the two sets of rules, and then focus on
types of facts which the Montana Supreme Court has held are
and are not suitable for judicial notice. I will treat the procedure
for obtaining judicial notice, and its effect if granted, in Part II of
this article, to be published in the next Evidence Corner column.
MRE v FRE judicial notice provisions
Article II of the Montana Rules of Evidence is entitled
"Judicial Notice." It contains two rules: Rule 201, "Judicial
Notice of Facts," and Rule 202, "Judicial Notice of Law."
Article II of the Federal Rules of Evidence bears the same title.
However, there is only one rule in the article: FRE 201, entitled
"Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts." There is no specific
rule for judicial notice of law in the federal courts. Helpfully,
FRE 20 1(a) defines the scope of the rule: "(a) Scope. This rule
governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legisla-
tive fact." Unhelpfully, the rule nowhere defines "adjudicative
fact" or "legislative fact." The rule also fails to discuss whether
the federal courts may take judicial notice of a legislative fact
or whether the exclusion of these facts from FRE 201 prohibits
judicial notice of them. The cases discussing the application and
effect of FRE 201 are in profound disarray.
As only one example, the federal circuits disagree on the
classification of a relatively simple and frequently necessary
type of jurisdictional fact: whether a particular piece of ground
is "federal" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) for purposes
of a criminal assault charge against a prisoner incarcerated in a
federal prison. In an assault case stemming from an incident in
Puerto Rico, the trial judge took judicial notice under Rule 201
of the fact that the prison where the assault occurred was "within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, characterizing this fact as "adjudicative." The 1st Circuit
affirmed, but noted disagreement by other circuits:
Some other Courts of Appeals have held that Rule
201 is not applicable to judicial notice that a place
is within the "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States," finding this to be
a "legislative fact" beyond the scope of Rule 201.
See United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d
802, 811 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Bowers, 660
F.2d 527, 531 (5th Cir.1981); see also II Kenneth
Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law
Treatise, § 10.6, at 155 (3d. ed.1994). But see Wright
& Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5103 n. 16
(1999 Supp.) ("One court has resolved the problem
by a dubious holding that the fact that Fort Benning
is under the jurisdiction of the United States is a
legislative fact," citing Bowers).
United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999).'
Mississippi, whose Judicial Notice rule is identical to the
federal rule, made the following comment, which illustrates
clearly why Montana did not (and should not) mirror the FRE
treatment of judicial notice:
COMMENT
(a) The entire codification of the law ofjudicial
notice is in Rule 201. Professor Kenneth Davis, in
1 The federal split continues. In 2013, after it held that the prosecution had not ad-
duced evidence of the jurisdictional element at trial, the 2" Circuit itself took notice of
this same jurisdictional fact on appeal, stating: "whether a particular plot of land falls
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States is a'legislative
fact'that may be judicially noticed without being subject to the strictures of Rule 201."
United States v. Davis 726 F.3d 357, 367 (2d Cir. 2013).
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his now famous article, "An Approach to Problems
of Evidence in the Administrative Process", 55
Harv.L.Rev. 364 (1942), divided judicial notice into
two parts, adjudicative and legislative. Adjudicative
facts are easily understood; they are specific to the
litigation. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are
more amorphous. To determine legislative facts one
must look at the public policy or policies involved in
judge-made law. Despite the existence of two types of
judicial notice, Rule 201 only governs judicial notice
of adjudicative facts. A court's application of judicial
notice of legislative facts is more an inherent part of the
judicial process rather than an evidentiary matter.
Clear as mud? And most of the federal cases do use
Professor Davis' Administrative Law treatise and article to
muddle through the uncertain divide between adjudicative fact
(judicially noticeable per F.R.E. 201) and non-adjudicative fact
(not mentioned in the rule at all2, and renamed "legislative fact"
by Professor Davis).
Montana's Evidence Commission also observed the disar-
ray in the federal system over judicial notice and wisely chose
to sidestep it by providing clearer and more specific rules. The
Commission Comment minces no words:
The Commission believes that use of the terms
"adjudicative" and "legislative" facts as is done with
Federal Rule 201 is confusing and that they cannot be
readily or easily applied to all factual situations. The
Commission rejects the approach under the Federal
Rule 201 of limiting judicial notice to adjudicative
facts because this is a basis which is totally new, not
clearly defined, and contrary to existing Montana
practice. The confusion and litigation bound to result
are clearly contrary to a rule which is meant to save
time and expense.
Bless their hearts. Because this column is devoted to
Montana-specific evidence subjects, I will follow the lead of the
Montana Commission Comment and leave the federal confu-
sion to the federal commentators and courts. Thus, the rest of
this article focuses exclusively on Montana state court use of
judicial notice.
Montana cases
WestlawNext lists 201 cases in its annotations to M.R.E.
201. I have scanned that list, and found that the large major-
ity of Montana judicial notice cases there predate the current
version of M.R.E. 201. Because the Evidence Commission
explicitly commented that it "intend[ed] to preserve existing law
in Montana" in M.R.E. 201, the older cases are still valuable but
I have chosen here to concentrate on more recent jurisprudence
applying the M.R.E. rules. The subject is quite vibrant; there are
five cases in just the first three months of 2016. I have organized
2 It turns out that the omission of non-adjudicative fact from FR.E. is construed to liber-
ate the use of judicial notice of these facts (if you can figure out what they are) from the
strictures of Rule 201, rather than indicating that no judicial notice of non-adjudicative
facts should be allowed. See, U.S. v. Gould, 536 F2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976): "..rule 201
is not all-encompassing."Rule 201 * * * was deliberately drafted to cover only a small
fraction of material usually subsumed under the concept of'judicial notice."'1 J.Wein-
stein, Evidence P 201(01) (1975).'
them below in technical categories of "OK" and "not OK" both
for Rule 201 (fact) and Rule 202 (law). Obviously, this list is il-
lustrative but not exhaustive.
Judicial Notice OK per Montana cases under MRE 201 (Fact)
The Montana Supreme Court recently has approved the
taking of judicial notice of facts under M.R.E. 201 in several
contexts.
In a highly contentious dispute between feuding family
members as to an elderly Alzheimer's patient with significant as-
sets, the court approved judicial notice of the fact of the compe-
tence of a particular attorney in a particular location to under-
take the complex guardianship. In re Guardianship ofA.M.M.
2015 MT 250, §64.
The court has sanctioned use of judicial notice frequently
in termination of parental rights proceedings. Its most explicit
discussion of this tool in this context is in In re A.S. W., decided
in 2014. In that case in Flathead County in 2013, DPHHS filed a
motion for judicial notice of the mother's two previous termina-
tions of parental rights from Cascade County in 2005. The 2005
order from Cascade County stated that the mother completed
three parenting classes, but she had not completed her treatment
plan. She objected to judicial notice, arguing that the previ-
ous terminations were not relevant to the present proceeding
because she was denied due process at the 2005 proceedings
because of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless,
the Flathead County court granted the motion for judicial no-
tice, and issued its own order terminating the mother's rights as
to her third child, A.S.W. In re AS. W., 2014 MT 251N,! 6, 376
Mont. 550, 347 P.3d 265.
The Supreme Court held that judicial notice of prior termi-
nations is proper:
! 12 Mother next argues that the District Court
should not have taken judicial notice of her prior
2005 terminations under the Montana Rules of
Evidence. However, judicial notice may be taken of
facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned." M.R. Evid. 201(b) (2). Judicial notice
must be taken "if requested by a party and supplied
with the necessary information." M.R. Evid. 20 1(d). A
district court may take judicial notice of " [r] ecords of
any court of this state or of any court of record of the
United States or any court of record of any state of the
United States." M.R. Evid. 202(b)(6). Applying these
rules to termination of parental rights proceedings, we
have held that "[a] district court, by necessity, must
take judicial notice of prior terminations if it is to
determine whether those terminations are relevant
to the parents' ability to care for the child currently
at issue." In re T.S.B., ! 35. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the fact that the mother has prior
terminations of parental rights is not clearly and
reasonably disputed. To the extent that the District
Court considered the circumstances of the prior
termination as set forth in the Cascade County
Evidence, next page
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District Court's Findings of Fact, we have previously
held: "[A] termination under § 41-3-609(1)(d),
MCA, requires a court to take judicial notice of
prior terminations and the facts and circumstances
surrounding those orders. See M.R. Evid. 201, 202." In
re T.S.B.! 35 (Emphasis added.)
5 14 In this case, the circumstances of the mother's
prior terminations were very similar to the situation
with A.S. W. Clinical psychologists in both the 2005
Cascade County case, and in the 2013 Flathead
County case testified to the mother's inability to
care for her children due to her permanent mental
deficiencies. As the Cascade County Court did in
2005, the District Court in this case concluded that
no services exist that would allow the mother to
learn to care for her children within a reasonable
time. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse
its discretion by taking judicial notice of her prior
terminations.
In re A.S. W., 2014 MT 251N, 55 12-14, 376 Mont. 550, 347
P.3d 265. See also, In rej.S., 2015 MT 59N, ! 8, 378 Mont. 540,
348 P.3d 672.
In another case terminating parental rights, the trial judge
took judicial notice of another type of fact - that the contest-
ing father had several recent felony convictions and had been
sentenced for them to 100 years at the Montana State Prison,
with 60 years suspended. The Montana Supreme Court found
several "harmless" procedural errors in the termination process,
but did not include the taking of judicial notice among them.
The result was affirmed. In re N.B., 2015 MT 88N,! 7, 378
Mont. 542, 348 P.3d 673. See also, In re J.B.. Jr., 2016 MT 68; In
re M.S., 376 Mont. 394, 336 P.3d 930, 2014 MT 265.
In A.S. W, the court explicitly distinguished another
2014 case involving the use of judicial notice of CSED income
determinations in a trial for child support. Joe, the dad, had two
children with his ex-wife, Lona. At the time of their divorce, he
was earning more than $87,000 and the court set his monthly
child support at $1,381.00. Joe resigned from his job and
invested in a real estate development company, from which he
expected to make his living. He twice petitioned for a reduction
in child support. He was successful the first time, achieving a
substantial reduction in his obligation. Before the hearing on
the second petition for reduction of support, however, Joe had
another child with another woman, Joann. Joann opened a case
with the Child Support Enforcement Division to determine
support for that child. On appeal from the initial ruling, the ALJ
found Joe's income to be less than $25,000 and set his obligation
for Joann's child at $83 per month.
In Joe's District Court action for modification for the support
of Lona's children, he moved for judicial notice of the CSED's
income determination. Lona opposed the motion on the
grounds she wasn't present at and had no notice of the CSED
proceeding and should not be bound by it. The Court ruled on
the motion cryptically:
"[T] he Court sees no problem with taking judicial
notice of the fact that CSED made a determination
as to what Joe's income is." It continued, "This in
no way binds this court and does not limit Lona's
ability to introduce evidence to the contrary."
Citing the Commission Comments to Rule 201,
the District Court stated that because the amount
of Joe's income was in dispute, Lona was to be
afforded the opportunity to contest the CSED
income determination. The District Court concluded:
"The Court will take judicial notice of CSED's
determination of Joe's income, but does not intend to
be bound by that determination. Lona will be given
full opportunity at the hearing to present whatever
evidence she has that might suggest that Joe is
voluntarily underemployed."
In re Marriage of Carter-Scanlon & Scanlon, 2014 MT 97,
11, 374 Mont. 434, 437, 322 P.3d 1033, 1035.
Lona was allowed to present expert testimony about Joe's
employability and imputed income. The judge did impute
annual income of $52,000 and denied any reduction in child
support. (The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law confus-
ingly indicated that the father had requested judicial notice, but
that the court had denied the motion).
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted the apparent inconsis-
tency in the trial judge's statements about judicial notice, and
took the opportunity to discuss the purpose of judicial notice
and the differences between Rule 201 and 202. Ultimately, it
held:
[A] s Rule 201 clearly states, and a substantial body of
federal case law holds, a court may not take judicial
notice of fact from a prior proceeding when the fact is
reasonably disputed, as it is here. M.R. Evid. 201(b);
see Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th
Cir.2001) ( "[T]aking judicial notice of findings of fact
from another case exceeds the limits of Rule 201.");
Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th
Cir.2001) ["[W] hen a court takes judicial notice of
another court's opinion, it may do so not for the truth
of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the
opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute
over its authenticity" (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)]; Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm
Networks, 69 F.3d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir.1995) ("In
order for a fact to be judicially noticed, indisputability
is a prerequisite."). Thus, although Joe requested
judicial notice of fact, and arguably supplied the
necessary information pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201(d),
judicial notice of fact was not mandatory because the
fact was clearly and reasonably disputed.
! 24 We conclude that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the
existence of the CSED's administrative order, or
by refusing to take judicial notice of the truth of its
underlying facts.
In re Marriage of Carter-Scanlon & Scanlon, 2014 MT 97,!!
23-24, 374 Mont. 434, 441-42, 322 P.3d 1033, 1038. The Court
took pains to distinguish this case from the parental termination
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cases, and to reiterate that trial courts may continue to take judi-
cial notice of the felony convictions and sentences of the parents
in those cases.
Judicial Notice Not OK Under MRE 201 per Montana cases
Shortly before M.R.E. 201 went into effect, the Montana
Supreme Court analyzed a Workers' Compensation Proceeding
in which the judge below took judicial notice of the contents of
the claimant's medical file. Relying on F.R.E. 201, the court ob-
served that it allowed judicial notice of adjudicative facts only (a
distinction eliminated in the 1978 M.R.E.) but did not expressly
find whether or not the letters in the file from doctors who did
not testify were adjudicative or not. The court's holding still
applies today:
Disputed medical conclusions by doctors contained
in medical reports cannot be judicially noticed. It
should be remembered judicial notice is intended to
save time and expense by not requiring formal proof
for Undisputed facts. Judicial notice cannot supply
evidence in the form of unsworn hearsay testimony
in letters, absent agreement of the parties.
(Emphasis added).
Hert v. J. J. Newberry Co., 178 Mont. 355, 365, 584 P.2d 656,
662 (1978)3.
The plaintiffs in Morrow v. Monfric, a wage dispute, sought
certification as a class of laborers on two construction projects
in Kalispell. The district judge denied the class certification. On
appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, observing that the
"proposed class in this case includes 24 to 28 persons, seven of
whom are named plaintiffs and class representatives. This is near
the number below which class certification is likely to be consid-
ered inappropriate." Morrow v. Monfric, Inc., 2015 MT 194, !
11, 380 Mont. 58, 62, 354 P.3d 558, 562. The court allowed that
geographic dispersion of the class members might tip the bal-
ance to certification, but held that the plaintiffs had the burden
of proving this factor and that their judicial notice request did
not carry that burden:
Plaintiffs argue that there is no evidence the proposed
class members still reside in the Kalispell area, and
ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact that
many Montana laborers work in the oil fields of North
Dakota. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence suggesting
that the laborers who worked on the Monfric projects
have left the Kalispell area. Indeed, at the hearing on
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, it was made
clear that counsel had not attempted to locate the
remaining proposed class members, and the idea
that they may have left for North Dakota was based
entirely on an off-the-cuff suggestion by the District
Court. Plaintiffs have not produced facts in support
of their argument that the geographical dispersion of
the proposed class members makes their joinder in a
single action impracticable. The District Court did not
3 Hert's holding about the non-admissibility of letters from doctors was changed
administratively, for Workers'Compensation proceedings only, in 1990 by the
adoption of Rule 24.5.317, ARM. Miller v. Frasure, 264 Mont. 354, 365, 871 P.2d
1302,1308 (1994).
abuse its discretion when it concluded that joinder
was not impracticable because the proposed class
members were in the same geographic area.
2015 MT 194, ! 13, 380 Mont. 58, 63-64, 354 P.3d 558,
562-63.
The court repeated the colloquy which occurred during the
trial court's hearing:
The District Court asked counsel for Plaintiffs why the
remaining 17 to 21 individuals could not simply be
joined as parties. Counsel responded, "I can try to do
that. I didn't have their names ... and I don't have all
their addresses." The District Court observed that the
proposed class was "a relatively small group of... local
employees, although I suppose if this work happened
... prior to 2008 anyway that they're probably all over
in North Dakota now."
2015 MT 194, ! 5, 380 Mont. 58, 60, 354 P.3d 558, 560.
As I will discuss in more detail next month, this case illus-
trates a common attempted use of judicial notice: to fill in a gap
the attorney could have, and should have, identified and filled
with actual evidence. As here, this usually does not work.
Judicial Notice OK under MRE 202 (Law)
The Court's most recent use of judicial notice occurred on
Feb. 25, 2016, in its decision in Montana Cannabis Industry
Association v. State, 2016 MT 44, regarding the 2011 Montana
Marijuana Act. Justice Baker, writing for the majority, stated:
After this case was argued, Plaintiffs called the Court's
attention to a recent Congressional Appropriations
Act that prohibits the Justice Department from
spending funds that would prevent states - including
Montana - from implementing their own laws
authorizing the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana. Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. 114-113, § 542 Div.
B, tit. V, 223 (2015). We take judicial notice of this
action pursuant to M. R. Evid. 202(b).
! 28. Oral argument occurred on Nov. 4, 2015. The plaintiffs
(challenging the act) filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of recent
enactment of the federal law which prohibited the DOJ from
interfering with Montana law regarding medical marijuana4 . The
state had previously opposed judicial notice of the pending fed-
eral bill on the grounds that it had not become law; once it was
enacted, the state did not oppose the motion for judicial notice.
However, the judicially noticed softening of federal law on the
cannabis issue did not sway the majority: "While the measure
does evince developing attitudes in Congress, the substantive
criminal prohibitions in federal law remain intact.
Almost as recently, the court clarified the distinction between
Rules 201 and 202 when it approved the trial court's judicial
Evidence, next page
4 https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0055%200ther%20--%2OMo-
tion%20-%200pposed?id=%7BC0446052-0000-C41 0-BBC7-2483FF9FF20D%7D
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notice of previous court proceedings in a long and complex
dispute:
26 The Montana Rules of Evidence allow a District
Court to take judicial notice of facts, M. R. Evid. 201,
or judicial notice of law, M. R. Evid. 202. Under Rule
202, the District Court may take judicial notice of
the "[r] ecords of any court of this state." M. R. Evid.
202(b)(6). We have held that this rule "includes prior
proceedings in other cases, Farmers Plaint Aid v.
Fedder, 2000 MT 87, !5 26-27, 299 Mont. 206, 999
P.2d 315, and prior proceedings in the same case,
State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 477-78, 914 P.2d 592,
603 (1996)." State v. Homer, 2014 MT 57, ! 8, 374
Mont. 157, 321 P.3d 77. In this case, the District Court
noted in its order granting the bank's motion for
summary judgment that the "factual and procedural
backgrounds are based on the record in this case,
as well as court records the Court is entitled to take
judicial notice of under Rule 202." The District Court
then listed the opinions and records of which it was
taking judicial notice, including our opinion in the
Foreclosure Action, and the District Court records of
the Interpleader Action and the Foreclosure Action.
Rule 202 allows a District Court to take judicial
notice of the prior proceedings in this case and in
other cases, and the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in so doing.
27 Further, in order to properly consider the bank's
argument that the estate's claims were barred by the
compulsory counterclaim rule or by claim preclusion,
the District Court would have needed to review the
record in the Foreclosure Action to determine if the
issues presented in that action were the same as the
issues presented in this action, and to determine
if the facts alleged in the Estate's complaint in this
action were in existence during the pendency of the
previous action. The District Court did just that:
reviewed the discovery produced in the Foreclosure
Action and determined that the facts central to the
Estate's present claims were in existence during the
Foreclosure Action. The District Court did not take
improper judicial notice of facts under Rule 201, but
rather properly exercised its discretion under Rule
202 to take judicial notice of the record in previous
actions. (Emphasis added.)
Estate of Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, 2016 MT 25.
The rendering of an order by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana, dismissing a plaintiffs federal case: "We
take judicial notice of the United States District Court's Order
pursuant to M. R. Evid. 202(4), (6) (allowing a court, whether
requested by a party or not, to take judicial notice of official acts
of the judicial departments of the United States and of records
of any court of record of the United States)." Townsend v. Glick,
2015 MT 329N, §4;
The Supreme Court noted, without criticism, the fact that
one district court had taken judicial notice of related proceed-
ings already pending in another district court. The Court af-
firmed the noticing court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment
action:
! 7 On Sept. 22, 2014, the 18th Judicial District Court
in Gallatin County dismissed Murray's declaratory
relief action for lack of a justiciable controversy and
declined to rule on the COPP's motion for summary
judgment. Noting its authority under M.R. Evid.
202, the court took judicial notice of the pending
proceedings in the 1st Judicial District Court and
concluded that Murray already had "an adequate
alternative remedy available to him in that he may
assert-and may already have asserted-the issues
sought to be declared here as a defense," in the
Enforcement Action. The court also concluded that
any decision it might make would not bind the First
Judicial District Court and would otherwise result in
an advisory opinion.
Murray v. Motl, 2015 MT 216, ! 7, 380 Mont. 162, 164, 354
P.3d 197, 198.
Estate of Gopher raised the issue of Montana state court
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving Indian liti-
gants. The decedent and heirs were all enrolled members of the
Blackfeet Nations. The primary asset of the estate was a historic
flag, which was located at the decedent's house in Great Falls,
off the reservation. In affirming the state judge's decision to as-
sume subject matter jurisdiction, the Court extended the use of
Rule 202 to include tribal law, even though the phrase does not
explicitly appear in the text of the rule:
5 13 At issue is whether the District Court's
assumption of subject matter jurisdiction infringed on
tribal self-government. To resolve the issue, we look to
the Blackfeet Tribal Court's February 26, 2013, order.
Judicial notice of laws may be taken at any stage of the
proceedings. M.R.Evid. 202(f)(1), MCA. Our Rules
of Evidence include a non-exhaustive list of the kinds
of law appropriate for judicial notice and provide
that a court may take judicial notice of " [r] ecords of
any court of this state or of any court of record of
the United States or any court of record of any state
of the United States." M.R.Evid. 202(b)(6), MCA. A
tribal court order, though not expressly listed in the
rule, is a record analogous to those listed in M.R.Evid.
202(b)(6), MCA, and is thus law of which we may take
judicial notice. We note that the order was not filed
until after the siblings had filed their opening brief.
However, as the siblings do not take issue with the
genuineness of the order, we take judicial notice of the
tribal court order.
5 14 In its order, the Blackfeet Tribal Court
unequivocally declined to assert subject matter
jurisdiction with respect to the flag, the subject of this
appeal.
In re Estate of Gopher, 2013 MT 264, !5 13-14, 372 Mont. 9,
12-13, 310 P.3d 521, 523.
In a long-contested dissolution proceeding, at this stage
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centered on mutual child support arrearages, the Court held that
Rule 202 authorized judicial notice of an Order of the federal
Bankruptcy Court:
! 30 Finally, Luna claims that the marital debt
owed to her by Steab "could not be released via
bankruptcy." Essentially, Luna is asking the District
Court and this Court to overturn, or simply ignore,
a federal bankruptcy court ruling. We are not
authorized to do so.
! 31 M.R. Evid. 20 1(d) authorizes the District Court
to take judicial notice of facts when "requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information."
Moreover, M.R. Evid. 202(b)(6) allows a court to
take judicial notice of law, including, "[r] ecords of
any court of this state or of any court of record of
the United States or any court of record of any state
of the United States." See Farmers Plant Aid, Inc. v.
Fedder, 2000 MT 87, ! 27, 299 Mont. 206, 999 P.2d
315. Steab requested that the court take notice of the
bankruptcy action and supplied the District Court
with the necessary information. Luna's claim of error
is against the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, not the District
Court. The District Court did not abuse its discretion
by taking judicial notice of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
order.
In re Marriage of Steab and Luna, 2013 MT 124, !5 30-31,
370 Mont. 125, 300 P. 3d 1168, 1173-1174.
Judicial notice not OK under 202
In State v. Homer, the defendant was charged with exploit-
ing an older person, by inducing her elderly mother to enter
into a reverse mortgage. The daughter used all of the proceeds,
$141,000, to pay off her own debts. Prior to trial, the judge held
a hearing to determine whether the victim was competent to
testify. The victim was sworn and testified briefly; both sides
conducted limited questioning of her. After that hearing, the
court found the witness competent. Unfortunately, between the
hearing and trial, the victim deteriorated and was not available
to testify at trial. At the bench trial, "Homer requested during
her case-in-chief that the District Court take judicial notice of
the testimony of the victim, given at the prior hearing held to
determine whether the victim was competent to testify." State
v. Homer, 2014 MT 57, 7, 374 Mont. 157, 159, 321 P.3d 77, 80
(emphasis added). Huh? What rule? 201 or 202? It gets worse,
straying even further from judicial notice:
The State objected because the prior proceeding had
dealt only with the victim's competency and that they
would have examined the victim more thoroughly
and on other issues if they had known that the
testimony would be offered at trial. The District Court
denied the request to include the competency hearing
transcript as evidence in the trial on the merits of
the charge, concluding that the testimony at the
competency hearing "does not really go sufficiently to
the issues that are before this Court."
2014 MT 57, 7, 374 Mont. at 159, 321 P.3d at 80. Whatever
the reasoning, the District Court was clear: the transcript was
not admitted, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the
Supreme Court noted:
! 8 A court may take judicial notice of the records
of any court of this state, M.R. Evid. 202(b) (6). That
includes prior proceedings in other cases, Farmers
Plant Aid v. Fedder, 2000 MT 87, !5 26-27, 299 Mont.
206, 999 P.2d 315, and prior proceedings in the same
case, State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 477-78, 914 P.2d
592, 603 (1996). In the Loh case, this Court upheld
admission in a bench trial of the evidence from a
prior suppression hearing in the same case. The State
had "presented its case-in-chief at the suppression
hearing," and the defendant was present with counsel.
Loh, 275 Mont. at 477-78, 914 P.2d at 603.
5 9 Both sides in the present case agree that the
testimony at the prior competency hearing was
hearsay under M.R. Evid 802....
2014 MT 57, 55 8-9, 374 Mont. at 159, 321 P.3d at 80.
The court went on to discuss the hearsay component of the
testimony, ultimately concluding the trial judge correctly ap-
plied the hearsay rule and its exceptions. My conclusion is that
the defense was on the ropes and "judicial notice" was a desper-
ate but valiant last gasp. The hearsay issue was the real problem,
and the real basis of the Supreme Court's decision.
Unfortunately, the dicta the court used in its cursory discus-
sion of judicial notice in Homer muddies, rather than clarifies,
judicial notice of earlier court proceedings. Homer cites Loh for
the proposition that judicial notice of testimony from an earlier
suppression hearing in the same case is proper. In fact, Loh
explicitly refused to rule on this issue:
On the basis of the record before us, and irrespective
of the trial court's taking judicial notice of the
testimony in the suppression hearing, we conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence at trial
on which the fact finder could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Loh was guilty of the offenses
charged. What is apparent from the record is that
if the court was without authority to take judicial
notice of the evidence at the suppression hearing for
purposes of proof at trial, the error was harmless at
most.
... we decline to address the propriety of the trial
court's taking judicial notice at trial of the evidence
and testimony from the suppression hearing. This
opinion should not be read as either approving or
disapproving of that procedure.
State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 478-79, 914 P.2d 592, 603-04
(1996) (emphasis added).
Ouch! I have included both Homer and Loh in the "not OK"
section to provide a warning that the use of Rule 202 to admit
evidence from earlier proceedings is not clear in any way. For
opponents facing such a request, be sure to include the actual
language from Loh in your argument, and object both on the
basis of improper judicial notice and on hearsay grounds.
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no need for government limits on core
political speech. The media corporations
exempted from regulation by BCRA, how-
ever, have emerged as problematic in this
24-hour news cycle world, choosing who
to gift with free media, and who to ignore,
based on what is best for their ratings.
Nevertheless, any attempt by Congress to
regulate this latest reality would require
a rewrite of the First Amendment's
"Freedom of the Press" language.
The current darling of the campaign
reform movement is a constitutional
amendment proposed by former Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens - the
author of the Citizens United dissent -
which reads as follows: Neither the First
Amendment nor any other provision of
this Constitution shall be construed to
prohibit the Congress or any state from
imposing reasonable limits on the amount
Ellingson, from page 24
match the power of big money in our
elections today.
Afterthoughts
As this article was being written, the
nominating campaigns for the presidency
were proceeding. Has the recent experi-
ence with these campaigns demonstrated
that fears created by Citizens United, et
of money that candidates for public office
or their supporters may spend in election
campaigns.3 3
This suggested amendment is quite
troubling, and as is true with most reform
efforts, is aimed at yesterday's problems,
not today's (much less whatever tomor-
row's might be). Do we really want to let
government limit political speech on blog
posts, Twitter exchanges, Facebook walls,
or whatever new methods of political com-
munication next come down the technolo-
gy pike? Is it wise to let the party currently
in power decide what is "reasonable" for
the party out of power to be able to spend
in its attempt to get back into power?
Should we let media conglomerates hand
out free media to boost their ratings, with
opportunities for candidates to counter
with paid media curtailed by Congress?
Do we want to give incumbents the power
33 http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/03/04/what-
are-justice-stevenss-proposed-six-amendments/
al. are unfounded? Super PACs and their
501(c)(4)s have been impotent despite
spending tens of millions in support of
Jeb Bush and against Donald Trump.
Bernie Sanders has shunned Super PACs
and has raised tens of millions without
them. We cannot yet draw lessons from
the 2016 campaign.
On a positive local note, Montana's
new Disclose Act takes full advantage of
the one regulatory avenue that remains
after Citizens United. Once again,
to limit crowd-funded expenditures aimed
at unseating them? My take is "no" on
all of these questions. History should be
our guide here. The censor is generally
friendly to the rich and powerful, not to
the 99 percent. Just ask Socrates.34
Back to the opening question: is cam-
paign finance reform needed? The latest
evidence seems to show that the ACLU
has this exactly right: Disclosure rules
should be tightened to cover dark money;
the speed of disclosure of contributors
and contributions should be increased;
and laws against "coordination" should be
better enforced.3 5 At this point, anything
more would be overkill in a war, which
thanks to improving technology, we may
no longer even need to fight.
34 http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/liste.
html?tid=415&artid=475
35 https://www.aclu.org/aclu-and-citizens-united and
http://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/campaign-
finance-reform
Montana is taking the lead.
Conclusion
Some may doubt the existence of a
problem. Governing by an elite, be it
intellectual or economic, has long ap-
pealed to some. But this is not the ideal
that animates the exceptionalism of our
Republic. We must find a path back to
that ideal, and to a government "of, by
and for the people."
argued that the District Court erred in ground not that the law of California and
Evidence, from page 21 refusing his request to take judicial notice Nevada was an inappropriate subject for
of the marijuana laws and court decisions judicial notice but on the ground that it
I would like to end this column on a in California and Nevada in support of was irrelevant to the question of man-
positive note, and a recent Missoula case his contention that he was entitled to juana use in Montana. Perhaps the better
serves the purpose perfectly. Michael use marijuana in Montana as a matter lesson from this case (and life?) is that
Claude Urziceanu was convicted in of medical necessity. City of Missoula v. "There is no fundamental right to possess
Missoula Municipal Court of misdemean- Urziceanu, 2015 MT 79N, 4,378 Mont. and use marijuana." 2015MT79N, 10.
or possession of marijuana. The District 541, 348 P.3d 673. The Supreme Court See you next month.
Court affirmed. On appeal, the defendant affirmed the conviction, apparently on the
disturbance of emotions and conduct."' 7' Shaun Thompson was appointed Chief
Disbarment, from page 15 Nonetheless, the COP unanimously rec- Disciplinary Counsel by the Montana
ommended disbarment. 72  Supreme Court in 2005. The Office of
account.17 1 _______ Disciplinary Counsel is responsible for the
intakelifovestaatidnNandadroenutionpofteth
In mitigation, Beccari was diagnosed 171 COP's FOE, COL and Recommendations (filed itkivsiainadrscto feh
with "adjustment disorder with mixed July 16, 2001), FOE 7,/In re Beccari, Case Nos. 01 -1 64 ics complaints against lawyers."
and 01 -165.
172 COP's FOE, COL and Recommendations (filed
July 16,2001), p. 6,T 7reBeccari, Case Nos. 01-164 and
170 Id. 01-165
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